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ABSTRACT
Consequential decision-making typically incentivizes individuals to
behave strategically, tailoring their behavior to the specifics of the
decision rule. A long line of work has therefore sought to counteract
strategic behavior by designing more conservative decision bound-
aries in an effort to increase robustness to the effects of strategic
covariate shift.
We show that these efforts benefit the institutional decision
maker at the expense of the individuals being classified. Introducing
a notion of social burden, we prove that any increase in institutional
utility necessarily leads to a corresponding increase in social bur-
den. Moreover, we show that the negative externalities of strategic
classification can disproportionately harm disadvantaged groups
in the population.
Our results highlight that strategy-robustness must be weighed
against considerations of social welfare and fairness.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As machine learning increasingly supports consequential decision
making, its vulnerability to manipulation and gaming is of grow-
ing concern. When individuals learn to adapt their behavior to
the specifics of a statistical decision rule, its original predictive
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power will deteriorate. This widely observed empirical phenome-
non, known as Campbell’s Law or Goodhart’s Law, is often summa-
rized as: “Once a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good
measure” [24].
Institutions using machine learning to make high-stakes deci-
sions naturally wish to make their classifiers robust to strategic
behavior. A growing line of work has sought algorithms that achieve
higher utility for the institution in settings where we anticipate
a strategic response from the the classified individuals [4, 10, 13].
Broadly speaking, the resulting solution concepts correspond to
more conservative decision boundaries that increase robustness to
some form of distributional shift.
But there is a flip side to strategic classification. As insitutional
utility increases as a result of more cautious decision rules, honest
individuals worthy of a positive classification outcome may face a
higher bar for success.
The costs incurred by individuals as a consequence of strategic
classification are by no means hypothetical, as the example of lend-
ing shows. In the United States, credit scores are widely deployed to
allocate credit. However, even creditworthy individuals routinely
engage in artificial practices intended to improve their credit scores,
such as opening up a certain number of credit lines in a certain
time period [9].
In this work, we study the tension between accuracy to the in-
stitution and impact to the individuals being classified. We first
introduce a general measure of the cost of strategic classification,
which we call the social burden. Informally, the social burden mea-
sures the expected cost that a positive individual needs to incur to
be correctly classified correctly.
For a broad class of cost functions, we prove there exists an
intrinsic trade-off between institutional accuracy and social burden:
any increase in institutional accuracy comes at an increase in social
burden. Moreover, we precisely characterize this trade-off and show
the commonly considered Stackelberg equilibrium solution achieves
maximal institutional accuracy at the expense of maximal social
burden.
Equipped with this generic trade-off result, we turn towards a
more careful study of how the social burden of strategic classifi-
cation impacts different subpopulations. We find that the social
burden can fall disproportionally on disadvantaged subpopulations,
under two different notions by which one group can be disadvan-
taged relative to another group. Furthermore, we show that as the
institution improves its accuracy, it exacerbates the gap between
the burden to an advantaged and disadvantaged group. Finally, we
illustrate these conditions and their consequences with a case study
on FICO data.
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1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
(1) We prove a general result demonstrating the trade-off be-
tween institutional accuracy and individual utility in the
strategic setting. Our theoretical characterization is supple-
mentedwith examples illustratingwhen an institutionwould
prefer to operate along different points in this trade-off curve.
(2) We show fairness considerations inevitably arise in the strate-
gic setting. When individuals incur cost as a consequence of
making a classifier robust to strategic behavior, we show the
costs can disproportionally fall by disadvantaged subpopula-
tions. Furthermore, as the institution increases its robustness,
it also increases the disparity between subpopulations.
(3) Using FICO credit data as a case-study, we empirically vali-
date our modeling assumptions and illustrate both the gen-
eral trade-offs and fairness concerns involved with strategic
classification in a concrete setting.
Reflecting on our results, we argue that the existing view of strate-
gic classification has been instituition-centric, ignoring the social
burden resulting from improved institutional utility. Our frame-
work makes it possible to select context-specific trade-offs between
institutional and individual utility, leading to a richer space of solu-
tions.
Another key insight is that discussions of strategy-robustness
must go hand in hand with considerations of fairness and the real
possibility that robustness-promoting mechanisms can have dis-
parate impact in different segments of the population.
2 MODEL
Strategic classification. Throughout this work, we consider
the binary classification setting. Each individual has features x ∈ X
and a label y ∈ Y = {0, 1}. The institution publishes a classifier
f : X → Y. In the non-strategic setting, the institution maximizes
the non-strategic utility, which is simply the classification accuracy
of f :
U(f ) = P(f (x) = y) .
In the strategic setting, the individual can modify their features,
and the institution aims to preempt the individual’s strategic manip-
ulation. In response to the institution’s classifier f , the individual
can change her features x to new features x ′. However, modifica-
tion incurs a cost given by c : X × X → R≥0. The individual then
receives an individual utility ux (f ,x ′) = f (x ′) − c(x ,x ′), which
trades off between the cost of manipulation c(x ,x ′) and the benefits
of classification f (x ′).
The institution models the individual x as maximizing their
utility ux (f ,x ′) and acting according to the best-response to the
classifier f :
∆(x ; f ) = argmax
x ′
ux (f ,x ′).
When it is clear from context we will drop the dependence on f
and write the individual’s best response as ∆(x). Although ∆(x)
may not have a unique maximizer, it is assumed that the individual
x does not adapt her features if she is already accepted by the
classifier, i.e. f (x) = 1, or if there is no maximizer x ′ she can move
to such that f (x ′) = 1. In cases where the individual does adapt,
let x ′ be an arbitrary maximizer such that f (x ′) = 1. In practice, it
is unlikely individuals actually play best-response solutions, and
we will discuss as appropriate the impact of deviations from best-
response play.
Given this model, the institution aims to maximize the strategic
utility, which measures accuracy after individual responses:
U∆(f ) = P(f (∆(x)) = y).
For example, imagine that the institution is trying to rank pages
on a social network. Although the number of likes a page has may
be predictive, it is also an easy feature to game. Therefore, models
with high strategic utility will assign low weight to this feature,
even if it is useful in the static setting. Henceforth, we will refer to
the strategic utility as simply the institutional utility.
Social burden. Focusing purely on maximizing U∆, as done
in prior work, ignores the cost a classifier imposes on individuals
[5, 12, 14]. To account for these costs, we define the individual
burden of a classifier f as the minimum cost an individual needs to
incur in order to be classified positively: bf (x) = minf (x ′)=1 c(x ,x ′).
For positive individuals with y = 1, a high individual burden
means the individual has to incur great cost to obtain the correct
classification. To quantity this cost, we introduce the social burden,
defined as the expected individual burden of positive individuals.
Definition 2.1 (Social burden). The social burden of a classifier f
is defined as B+(f ) = E
[
bf (x) | y = 1
]
.
The social burden measures the expected cost that positive in-
dividuals would need to incur to be classified positively, regard-
less of whether the best response ∆(x) indicates that they should
adapt. One could imagine other ways of measuring the impact
on individuals, such as the expected utility of positive individuals,
E [ux (f ,∆(x)) | y = 1], or the corresponding measure over all indi-
viduals, rather than only positive individuals. Most of our results
still hold for these alternative measures, and we relegate discussion
about the choice of social burden to Section 7.
Assumptions on cost function. While there are many possible
models for the cost function, we restrict our attention to a natu-
ral set of cost functions that we call outcome monotonic. Outcome
monotonic costs capture two intuitive properties: (1) Monotoni-
cally improving one’s outcome requires monotonically increasing
amounts of work, and (2) it is zero cost to worsen one’s outcome.
This captures the intuition that, for example, it is harder to pay
back loans than it is to go bankrupt.
Definition 2.2 (Outcome likelihood). The outcome likelihood of
an individual x is ℓ(x) = P(Y = 1 | X = x).
We assume that all individuals have a positive outcome likeli-
hood, i.e, ℓ(x) > 0 for all x .
Definition 2.3 (Outcome Monotonic Cost). A cost function c :
X × X → R≥0 is outcome monotonic if for any x ,x ′,x∗ ∈ X the
following properties hold.
• Zero-cost to move to lower outcome likelihoods. c(x ,x ′) > 0 if
and only if ℓ(x ′) > ℓ(x).
• Monotonicity in first argument. c(x ,x∗) > c(x ′,x∗) > 0 if and
only if ℓ(x∗) > ℓ(x ′) > ℓ(x).
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• Monotonicity in second argument. c(x ,x∗) > c(x ,x ′) > 0 if
and only if ℓ(x∗) > ℓ(x ′) > ℓ(x).
Under these assumptions, we can equivalently express the cost
as a cost over outcome likelihoods, cL : ℓ(X)×ℓ(X) → R≥0, defined
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. When the cost function c(x ,x ′) is outcome monotonic,
then it can be written as a cost function over outcome likelihoods
cL(l , l ′) B c(x ,x ′) where x ,x ′ ∈ X are any points such that l = ℓ(x)
and l ′ = ℓ(x ′).
Proof. The monotonicity assumptions imply that if ℓ(x∗) =
ℓ(x ′), then c(·,x ′) = c(·,x∗) and c(x ′, ·) = c(x∗, ·). Thus, cL(l , l ′) B
c(x ,x ′) is well-defined because any points x and x ′ such that l =
ℓ(x) and l ′ = ℓ(x ′) yield the same value of c(x ,x ′). □
Throughout the paper, we will make use of the equivalent like-
lihood cost cL when a proof is more naturally expressed with cL ,
rather than with the underlying cost c .
3 INSTITUTIONAL UTILITY VERSUS SOCIAL
BURDEN
In this section, we characterize the inherent trade-offs between
institutional utility and social burden in the strategic setting. In
particular, we show any classifier that improves institutional utility
over the best classifier in the static setting causes a corresponding
increase in social burden.
To prove this result we first show that any classifier can be
represented as a threshold classifier that accepts all individuals
with outcome likelihood greater than some threshold τ ∈ [0, 1].
Then, we show increasing utility for the institution requires raising
this threshold τ , but that this always increases the social burden.
Equipped with this result, we show the (Pareto-optimal) set of
classifiers that increase institutional utility in the strategic setting
corresponds to an interval I . Each threshold τ ∈ I represents a
particular trade-off between institutional utility and social bur-
den. Strategic classification corresponds to one extremum: the best
strategic utility but the worst social burden. The non-strategic util-
ity corresponds to the other: doing nothing to prevent gaming.
Neither is likely to be the right trade-off in practical contexts. Real
domains will require a careful weighting of these two utilities, lead-
ing to a choice somewhere in between. Thus, a main contribution
of our work is exposing this interval.
3.1 General Trade-Off
We now proceed to prove the trade-off between institutional utility
and social burden. Our first step is to show that in the strategic
setting we can restrict attention to classifiers that threshold on the
outcome likelihood (assuming the cost is outcome monotonic as in
Definition 2.3).
Definition 3.1 (Outcome threshold classifier). An outcome thresh-
old classifier f is a classifier of the form f (x) = I{ℓ(x) ≥ τ } for
τ ∈ [0, 1].
In practice, the institution may not know the outcome likelihood
ℓ(x) = P(Y = 1 | X = x). However, as shown in the next lemma,
for any classifier that they do use, there is a threshold classifier
with equivalent institutional utility and social burden. Thus, we
can restrict our theoretical analysis to only consider threshold
classifiers.
Lemma 3.1. For any classifier f there is an outcome threshold
classifier f ′ such thatU∆(f ) = U∆(f ′) and B+(f ) = B+(f ′).
Proof. Let τ (f ) = minx :f (x )=1 ℓ(x) be the minimum outcome
likelihood at which an individual is accepted by the classifier f .
Then, let f ′(x) = I{ℓ(x) ≥ τ (f )} be the outcome threshold classi-
fier that accepts all individuals above τ (f ). We will show that the
institutional utility and social burden of f and f ′ are equal.
Since the cost function is outcome monotonic, it is the same cost
to move to any point with the same outcome likelihood. Further-
more, it is higher cost to move to points of higher likelihood, i.e,
if ℓ(x ′) > ℓ(x∗) > ℓ(x), then c(x ,x ′) > c(x ,x∗) > 0. Since indi-
viduals game optimally, when an individual changes her features
in response to the classifier f , she has no incentive to move to a
point with likelihood higher than τ (f ) – that would just cost more.
Therefore, she will move to any point with likelihood τ (f ) to be
accepted by f and will incur the same cost, regardless of which
point it is. Thus, we can write the set of individuals accepted by f ,
A∆(f ), as
A∆(f ) = {x | f (∆(x)) = 1}
= {x | ∃x ′ : f (x ′) = 1, c(x ,x ′) ≤ 1}
= {x | ∃ x ′ : ℓ(x ′) = τ (f ), c(x ,x ′) ≤ 1} .
Since τ (f ) = τ (f ′), the individuals accepted by f and f ′ are
equal: A∆(f ) = A∆(f ′). Therefore, their institutional utilities
U∆(f ) andU∆(f ′) are equal. We can similarly show that the social
burdens of f and f ′ are also equal:
B+(f ) = E
[
min
x ′:f (x ′)=1
c(x ,x ′) | y = 1
]
,
= E
[
c(x ,x ′) | y = 1] for some x ′ : ℓ(x ′) = τ (f ),
= E
[
c(x ,x ′) | y = 1] for some x ′ : ℓ(x ′) = τ (f ′),
= E
[
min
x ′:f ′(x ′)=1
c(x ,x ′) | y = 1
]
= B+(f ′) .
□
Since outcome threshold classifiers can represent all classifiers
in the strategic setting, we will henceforth only consider outcome
threshold classifiers. Furthermore, we will overload notation and
useU∆(τ ) and B+(τ ) to refer toU∆(fτ ) and B+(fτ )where fτ (x) =
I{ℓ(x) ≥ τ } is the outcome threshold classifier with threshold τ .
Figure 1 illustrates how institutional utility and social burden
change as the threshold of the classifier increases. The institutional
utility is quasiconcave, while the social burden is monotonically
non-decreasing. The next lemma provides a formal characterization
of the shapes shown in Figure 1.
Theorem 3.1. The institutional utilityU∆(τ ) is quasiconcave in
τ and has a maximum at a threshold τ ∗ ≥ τ0 where τ0 = 0.5 is the
threshold of the non-strategic optimal classifier. The social burden
B+(τ ) is monotonically non-decreasing in τ . Furthermore, ifU∆(τ ) ,
U∆(τ ′), then B+(τ ) , B+(τ ′).
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Figure 1: The general shapes of the institution utility and
social burden as a function of the threshold the institution
chooses. The threshold t0 is the non-strategic optimal, while
the threshold τ ∗ is the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof. LetA∆(τ ) andA(τ ) be the set of individuals accepted by
f in the strategic and non-strategic setting, respectively. If τ < τ0,
we haveA∆(τ ) ⊇ A∆(τ0) ⊇ A(τ0). SinceA(τ0) is the optimal non-
strategic acceptance region, any x < A(τ0) has ℓ(x) < 0.5, and one
can increaseU∆ by not acceptingx , which impliesU∆(τ ) ≤ U∆(τ0).
Therefore, if a threshold τ ∗ is optimal for the institution, i.e. if
U∆(τ ∗) = maxτ U∆(τ ), then τ ∗ ≥ τ0.
Recall that a univariate function f (z) is quasiconcave if there
exists z∗ such that f is non-decreasing for z < z∗ and is non-
increasing for z > z∗. Let τ ∗ be as above. For τ0 < τ1 < τ ∗, we have
A∆(τ0) ⊇ A∆(τ1) ⊇ A∆(τ ∗). Since U∆(τ ∗) is optimal, A∆(τ ∗)
is the optimal strategic acceptance region, and thus U∆(τ0) ≤
U∆(τ1) ≤ U∆(τ ∗). Similarly, if τ1 > τ0 > τ ∗ we have thatA∆(τ ∗) ⊇
A∆(τ0) ⊇ A∆(τ1), and thus U∆(τ1) ≤ U∆(τ0) ≤ U∆(τ ∗). There-
fore,U∆(τ ) is quasiconcave in τ .
The individual burden bτ (x) = minℓ(x ′)≥τ c(x ,x ′) is monotoni-
cally non-decreasing in τ . Since the social burden B+(τ ) is equal
to E[bτ (x) | y = 1], the social burden is also monotonically non-
decreasing.
Suppose U∆(τ ) , U∆(τ ′) and without loss of generality let
τ < τ ′. For all individuals x , bτ ′(x) ≥ bτ (x). If there is at least one
individual x such that bτ ′(x) > bτ (x), then B+(τ ′) > B+(τ ). But
sinceU∆(τ ) , U∆(τ ′), there must exist an individual x such that
x ∈ A∆(τ )/A∆(τ ′) and p(X = x | Y = 1) > 0 since ℓ(x) > 0 by
assumption. For this individual bτ ′(x) > bτ (x). Therefore,U∆(τ ) ,
U∆(τ ′) implies B+(τ ′) , B+(τ ). □
As a corollary, if the institution increases its utility beyond that
attainable by the optimal classifier in the non-strategic setting, then
the institution also causes higher social burden.
Corollary 3.1. Let τ be any threshold and τ0 = 0.5 be the opti-
mal threshold in the non-strategic setting. IfU∆(τ ) > U∆(τ0), then
B+(τ ) > B+(τ0).
3.2 Choosing a Concrete Trade-off
The previous section shows increases in institutional utility come
at a cost in terms of social burden and vice-versa. This still leaves
open the question: what is the concrete trade-off an institution
should choose?
Theorem 3.1 provides a precise characterization of the choices
available to trade-off between institutional utility and social burden.
The baseline choice for the institution is to not account for strategic
behavior and use the non-strategic optimum τ0. Maximizing utility
without regard to social burden leads the institution to choose
τ ∗. In general, the interval [τ0,τ ∗] offers the set of trade-offs the
institution considers. Choosing τ > τ0 can increase robustness at
the price of increasing social burden. Thresholds τ > τ ∗ are not
Pareto-efficient and are not considered.
Much of the prior work in machine learning has focused exclu-
sively on solutions corresponding to the thresholds at the extreme:
τ0 and τ ∗. The threshold τ0 is the solution when strategic behavior
is not accounted for. The threshold τ ∗ is also known as the Stack-
elberg equilibrium and is the subject of recent work in strategic
classification [5, 12, 13]. While using τ ∗ may be warranted in some
cases, a proper accounting of social burden would lead institutions
to choose classifiers somewhere between the extremes of τ0 and τ ∗.
The exact choice of τ ∈ [τ0,τ ∗] is context-dependent and depends
on balancing concerns between institutional and broader social
interest. We now highlight cases where using τ0 or τ ∗ may be sub-
optimal, and using a threshold τ ∈ (τ0,τ ∗) that balances robustness
with social burden is preferable.
Example 3.1 (Expensive features.). If measuring a feature is costly
for individuals and offers limited gains in predictive accuracy, an
institution may choose to ignore the feature, even if it means giving
up accuracy on the margin. In an educational context, a university
may decide to no longer require applicants to submit standardized
test scores, which can cost applicants hundreds of dollars, if the
corresponding improvement in admissions outcomes is very small
[1].
Example 3.2 (Reducing social burden under resource constraints.).
Aid organizations increasingly use machine learning to determine
where to allocate resources after natural disasters [17]. In these
cases, positive individuals are precisely those people who are in
need of aid and may experience very high costs to change their
features. Using thresholds with high social burden is therefore un-
desirable. At the same time, aid organizations often face significant
resource constraints. False positives from individuals gaming the
classifier ties up resources that could be better used elsewhere. Con-
sequently, using the non-strategic threshold is also undesirable. The
aid organization should choose a some threshold τ with τ0 < τ < τ ∗
that reflects these trade-offs.
Example 3.3 (Misspecification of agent model.). Strategic classifi-
cation models typically assume the individual optimally responds
to the classifier f . In reality, individuals will not have perfect knowl-
edge of the classifier f when it is first deployed. Instead, they may
be able to learn about how the classifier works over time, and
gradually improve their ability to game the classifier. For example,
self-published romance authors exchanged information in private
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chat groups about how to best game Amazon’s book recommen-
dation algorithms [18]. For the institution, it is difficult to a priori
model the dynamics of how information about the classifier propa-
gates. A preferable solution may be to simply make the assumption
that the individual can best respond to the classifier, but to only
gradually increase the threshold from the non-strategic τ0 to the
Stackelberg optimal τ ∗ over time.
In fact, misspecification of the agent model (described above), is
why Brückner et al. [4] suggest the Stackelberg equilibrium is too
conservative, and instead prefer to use Nash equilibrium strategies.
Complementary to their observation, we show that there is a more
general reasonNash equilibriamay be preferable. Namely, that Nash
equilibria have lower social burden than the Stackelberg solution.
As the following lemma shows, in our context, the set of Nash
equilibria form an interval [tN ,τ ∗] ⊂ I for some tN ≥ t0. The proof
is deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose the cost over likelihoods cL is continuous and
ℓ(X) = [0, 1], i.e, all likelihoods have non-zero support. Then, the set
of Nash equilibrium strategies for the institution is [τN ,τ ∗] for some
τN ≥ τ0 where τ0 = 0.5 is the non-strategic optimal threshold and τ ∗
is the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy.
The Stackelberg equilibrium requires the institution to choose
τ ∗, whereas Nash equilibria give the institution latitude to trade-off
between institutional utility and social burden by choosing from
the interval [tN ,τ ∗] ⊂ I . This provides an additional argument in
favor of Nash equilibria– institutions can still reason in terms of
equilibria and achieve more favorable outcomes in terms of social
burden.
4 FAIRNESS TO SUBPOPULATIONS
Our previous section showed that increased robustness in the face
of strategic behavior comes at the price of additional social burden.
In this section, we show this social burden is not fairly distributed:
when the individuals being classified are from latent subpopulations,
say of race, gender, or socioeconomic status, the social burden can
disproportionately fall on disadvantaged subpopulations. Further-
more, we find that improving the institution’s utility can exacerbate
the gap between the social burden incurred by an advantaged and
disadvantaged group.
Concretely, suppose each individual is from a subpopulation
д ∈ {a,b}. The social burden a classifier f has on a groupд is the ex-
pectedminimum cost required for a positive individual from groupд
to be accepted: B+,д(f ) = E
[
minx ′:f (x ′)=1 c(x ,x ′) | Y = 1,G = д
]
.
We can then define the social gap between groups a and b:
Definition 4.1 (Social gap). The social gap G(f ) induced by a
classifier f is the difference in the social burden to groupb compared
to a: G(f ) = B+,b (f ) − B+,a (f ).
The social gap is a measure of how much more costly it is for a
positive individual from groupb to be accepted by the classifier than
a positive individual from group a. For example, there is evidence
that women need to attain higher educational qualifications than
their male counterparts to receive the same salary [6].
A high social gap is alarming for two reasons. First, even when
two people from group a and group b are equally qualified, the
individual from group a may choose not to participate at all because
of the cost she would need to endure to be accepted. Secondly, if she
does decide to participate, she may continue to be at a disadvantage
after being accepted because of the additional cost she had to endure,
e.g., repaying student loans.
Non-strategic classification can already induce a social gap be-
tween two groups, and strategic classification can exacerbate this
gap. We show this under two natural ways group b may be dis-
advantaged. In the first setting, the feature distributions of group
a and b are such that a positive individual from group b is less
likely to be considered positive, compared to group a. In the second
setting, individuals from group b have a higher cost to adapt their
features compared to group a. Under both of these conditions, any
improvement the institution can make to its own strategic utility
has the side effect of worsening (increasing) the social gap.
4.1 Different Feature Distributions
In the first setting we analyze, the way groups a and b differ is
through their distributions over features. We say that group b is
disadvantaged if the features distributions are such that positive
individuals from group b are less likely to be considered positive
than those from group a. Formally, this can be characterized as the
following:
Definition 4.2 (Disadvantaged in features). Let L+,д = ℓ(X ) | Y =
1,G = д be the outcome likelihood of a positive individual from
groupд, and let F+,д be the cumulative distribution function of L+,д .
We say that group b is disadvantaged in features if F+,b (l) > F+,a (l)
for all l ∈ (0, 1).
In the economics literature, the relationship between L+,a and
L+,b is referred to as strict first-order stochastic dominance [20].
Intuitively, that group b is disadvantaged in features if and only
if the distribution of L+,a can be transformed to the distribution
of L+,b by transferring probability mass from higher values to
lower values. This definition captures the notion that the outcome
likelihood of positive individuals from group b is skewed lower
than the outcome likelihood of positive individuals from a.
In a case study on FICO credit scores in Section 5, we find the
minority group (blacks) is disadvantaged in features compared to
the majority group (whites) (see Figure 2). There are many reasons
that a group could be disadvantaged in features. Below, we go
through a few potential causes.
Example 4.1 (Group membership explains away features). Even
if two groups are equally likely to have positive individuals, i.e.,
P(Y = 1 | G = a) = P(Y = 1 | G = b), group b can still be
disadvantaged compared to group a. Consider the graph below.
Although the label Y is independent of the group G, the label Y is
not independent of the group G once conditioned on the features
X because the group G can provide an alternative reason for the
observed features.
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Concretely, let groups a and b be native and non-native speakers of
english, X be the number of grammatical errors on an individual’s
job application, and Y be whether the individual is a qualified
candidate. Negative individuals (Y = 0) are less meticulous when
filling out their application and more likely to have grammatical
errors. However, for individuals from group b there is another
explanation for having grammatical errors – being a non-native
speaker. Thus, positive individuals from group b end up with lower
outcome likelihoods than those from a, even though they may be
equally qualified.
Example 4.2 (Predicting base rates). Suppose the rate of positives
in group b is lower than that of group a: P(Y = 1 | G = b) < P(Y =
1 | G = a). If there is a feature in the dataset that can be used
as a proxy for predicting the group, such as zip code or name for
predicting race, then the outcome likelihoods of positive individuals
from group b can end up lower than those of positive individuals
from group a because the features are simply predicting the base
rate of each group.
Social gap increases. We now state and prove the main result
showing that the social gap increases as the institution increases its
threshold for acceptance. Before turning to the result, we introduce
one technical requirement. The likelihood condition is that ∂cL (l,τ )
∂l
is monotonically non-increasing in τ for l ,τ ∈ [0, 1]. When the
cost function c is outcome monotonic, the likelihood condition is
satisfied for a broad class of differentiable likelihood cost functions
cL , such as the following examples.
• Differentiable separable cost functions of the form cL(l , l ′) =
max(c2(l ′) − c1(l), 0) for c1, c2 : [0, 1] → R≥0.
• Differentiable shift-invariant cost functions of the form
cL(l , l ′) =
{
c0(l ′ − l) l < l ′
0 l ≥ l ′ ,
for convex c0 : [0, 1] → R≥0.
Notably, any linear cost cL(l , l ′) = max(α(l ′ − l), 0) where α > 0
satisfies the likelihood condition.
Under the likelihood condition, we now show that the social gap
increases as the institution increases its threshold for acceptance.
Theorem 4.1. Let τ ∈ (0, 1] be the threshold of the classifier.
If group b is disadvantaged in features compared to group a, and
∂cL (l,τ )
∂l is monotonically non-increasing in τ , then G(τ ) is positive
and monotonically increasing over τ .
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, any outcome monotonic cost function
can be written as a cost over outcome likelihoods. Therefore, the
social burden can be written as
B+,д(τ ) = E [cL(ℓ(x),τ ) | Y = 1,G = д]
=
∫ τ
0
cL(l ,τ ) dF+,д(l),
where F+,д denotes the CDF of the group outcome likelihood L+,д .
Integrating by parts, we obtain a simple expression for B+,д(τ ):
B+,д(τ ) =
∫ τ
0
cL(l ,τ ) dF+,д(l)
= [cL(l ,τ )F+,д(l)]τ0 −
∫ τ
0
∂cL(l ,τ )
∂l
F+,д(l) dl
= −
∫ τ
0
∂cL(l ,τ )
∂l
F+,д(l) dl ,
where the last line follows because cL(τ ,τ ) = 0 and F+,д(0) = 0.
This expression for B+,д(τ ) allows us to conveniently write the
social gap as
G(τ ) = B+,b (τ ) − B+,a (τ ) =
∫ τ
0
∂cL(l ,τ )
∂l
(F+,a (l) − F+,b (l)) dl .
We now argue the social gap G(τ ) is positive. By the monotonicity
assumptions, ∂cL (l,τ )
∂l < 0 for l ∈ (0,τ ). Since group b is disadvan-
taged in features, F+,a (l) − F+,b (l) < 0 for l ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
G(τ ) > 0.
Now, we show G(τ ) is increasing in τ . Let 0 ≤ τ < τ ′ ≤ 1. Then,
the difference in the social gap is given by
G(τ ′) − G(τ ) =
∫ τ
0
∂ (cL(l ,τ ′) − cL(l ,τ ))
∂l
(F+,a (l) − F+,b (l)) dl
+
∫ τ ′
τ
∂cL(l ,τ ′)
∂l
(F+,a (l) − F+,b (l)) dl .
Since group b is disadvantaged in features, (F+,a (l) − F+,b (l)) < 0
for all l . By assumption, ∂cL (l,τ )
∂l is monotonically non-increasing
in τ , so the first term is non-negative. Similarly, ∂cL (l,τ
′)
∂l < 0 by
monotonicity, so the second term is positive. Hence, G(τ ′)−G(τ ) >
0, which establishes G(τ ) is monotonically increasing in τ . □
As a corollary, if the institution improves its utility beyond the
non-strategic optimal classifier, then it also causes the social gap to
increase.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose group b is disadvantaged in features
compared to group a, and ∂cL (l,τ )
∂l is monotonically non-decreasing
in τ . Let τ ∈ (0, 1] be a threshold and τ0 = 0.5 be the optimal non-
strategic threshold. IfU∆(τ ) > U∆(τ0), then G(τ ) > G(τ0).
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, if U∆(τ ) > U∆(τ0), then τ > τ0. By
Theorem 4.1, if τ > τ0, then G(τ ) > G(τ0). □
4.2 Different Costs
In Section 4.1, we showed that when two subpopulations have
different feature distributions, the social burden can disproportion-
ately fall on one group. In this section, we show that even if the
feature distributions of the two groups are exactly identical, the
social burden can still disproportionately impact one group.
We have thus far assumed the existence of a cost function c that
is uniform across groups a and b. For a variety of structural reasons,
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it is unlikely this assumption holds in practice. Rather, it is often
the case that different groups experience different costs for changing
their features.
When the cost for group b is systematically higher than the
cost for group a, we prove group b incurs higher social burden
than group a. Furthermore, if the institution improves its utility by
increasing its threshold τ , then as a side effect it also increases the
social gap between group b and a (Theorem 4.2).
Much of the prior work on fairness in classification focuses on
preventing unfairness that can arise when different subpopulations
have different distributions over features and labels [8, 14? ]. Our
result provides a reason to be concerned about the unfair impacts of
a classifier even when two groups have identical initial distributions.
Namely, that it can be easier for one group to game the classifier than
another.
Formally, we say that group b is disadvantaged in cost compared
to group a if the following condition holds.
Definition 4.3 (Disadvantaged in cost). Let cд(x ,x ′) be the cost
for an individual from group д to adapt their features from x to
x ′. Group b is disadvantaged in cost if cb (x ,x ′) = κca (x ,x ′) for all
x ,x ′ ∈ X and some scalar κ > 1.
Next, we give a variety of example scenarios of when a group
can be disadvantaged in cost.
Example 4.3 (Opportunity Costs). Many universities have adopted
gender-neutral policies that stop the “tenure-clock” for a year for
family-related reasons, e.g. childbirth. Ostensibly, no research is
expected while the clock is stopped. However, the adoption of
gender-neutral clocks actually increased the gap between the per-
centage of men and women who received tenure [2]. The suggested
cause is that women still shoulder more of the burden of bearing
and caring for children, compared to men. Men who stop their
tenure clock are more productive during the period than women,
who have a higher opportunity cost to doing research while raising
a child.
Example 4.4 (Information Asymmetry). A large portion of high-
achieving, low-income students do not apply to selective colleges,
despite the fact that these colleges are typically less expensive for
them because of the financial aid they would receive [15]. This
phenomenon seems to be due to low-income students having less
access to information about college [? ]. Since low-income students
havemore barriers to gaining information about college, it is natural
to assume that, compared to their wealthier peers, they have a
higher cost to strategically manipulating their admission features.
Example 4.5 (Economic Differences). Consider a social media
company that wishes to classify individuals as “influencers,” either
to more widely disseminate their content or to identify promising
accounts for online marketing campaigns. Wealthy individuals can
purchase followers or likes, whereas other groups have to increase
these numbers organically [7]. Consequently, the costs to increasing
one’s popularity metric differs based on access to capital.
Finally, our main technical result shows that even when the
distributions of groups a and b are identical, if group b is disadvan-
taged in cost, then when the institution increases its threshold for
acceptance, it also increases the social gap between the two groups.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose positive individuals from groups a and b
have the same distribution over features, i.e, if Z = (X | Y = 1), then
Z is independent of the group G. If group b is disadvantaged in cost
compared to group a, then the social gap G(τ ) is non-negative and
monotonically non-decreasing in the threshold τ .
Proof. Since X | Y = 1 is independent of G, the social burden
to a group д can be written as
B+,д(τ ) =
∫
X
min
x ′:fτ (x ′)=1
cд(x ,x ′)p(X = x | Y = 1) dx
where fτ is the outcome likelihood classifier with threshold τ . The
social gap can then be expressed as
G(τ ) = B+,b (τ ) − B+,a (τ )
=
∫
X
(κ − 1) min
x ′:fτ (x ′)=1
ca (x ,x ′) p(X = x | Y = 1) dx
= (κ − 1)B+,a (τ ).
Since the group social burden B+,a (τ ) is non-negative and mono-
tonically non-decreasing, the social gap G(τ ) is also non-negative
and monotonically non-decreasing. □
5 CASE STUDY: FICO CREDIT DATA
We illustrate the impact of strategic classification on different sub-
populations in the context of credit scoring and lending. FICO scores
are widely used in the United States to predict credit worthiness.
The scores themselves are derived from a proprietary classifier that
uses features that are susceptible to gaming and strategic manipu-
lation, for instance the number of open bank accounts.
We use a sample of 301,536 FICO scores derived from TransUnion
TransRisk scores [23] and preprocessed by Hardt et al. [14]. The
scores X are normalized to lie between 0 and 100. An individual’s
outcome is labeled as a default if she failed to pay a debt for at least
90 days on at least one account in the ensuing 18-24 month period.
Default events are labeled with Y = 0, and otherwise repayment
is denoted with Y = 1. The two subpopulations are given by race:
a = white and b = black.
We assume the credit lending institution accepts individuals
based on a threshold on the FICO score. Using the normalized scale,
a threshold of τ = 58 is typically used to determine eligibility for
prime rate loans [14]. Our results thus far have used thresholds on
the outcome likelihood, rather than a score. However, as shown in
Figure 3, the outcome likelihood is monotonic in the FICO score.
Therefore, all our conditions and results can be validated using the
score instead of the outcome likelihood.
5.1 Different Feature Distributions
In Section 4.1, we studied the scenario where the distribution of
outcome likelihoods ℓ(X ) = P(Y = 1 | X ) differed across subpopu-
lations. In particular, if the likelihoods of the positive individuals
in group B tend to be lower than the positive individuals in group
A, then increasing strategic robustness increases the social gap
between A and B.
Interestingly, such a skew in score distributions exists in the FICO
data. Black borrowers who repay their loans tend to have lower
FICO scores than white borrowers who repay their loans. In terms
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Figure 2: Comparison of the distribution of FICO scores
among black and white borrowers who repaid their loans.
Credit-worthy black individuals tend to have lower credit
scores than credit-worthy white individuals. The compari-
son of the corresponding CDFs demonstrates our “disadvan-
taged in features” assumption holds.
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Figure 3: Repayment probability as a function of credit score.
Crucially, the probability of repayment P(Y = 1 | x) is mono-
tonically increasing in x .
of the corresponding score CDFs, for every score x , F+,black(x) ≥
F+,white(x). Figure 2 demonstrates this observation.
When the score distribution among positive individuals is skewed,
Theorem 4.1 guarantees the social gap between groups is increas-
ing in the threshold under a reasonable cost model. Operationally,
raising the loan threshold to protect against strategic behavior
increases the relative burden on the black subgroup. To demon-
strate this empirically, we use a coarse linear cost model, c(x ,x ′) =
max(α(x ′ − x), 0) for some α > 0. Here, α corresponds to the cost
of raising one’s FICO score one point. Since the probability of re-
payment P(Y = 1 | x) is monotonically increasing in x , the linear
cost c satisfies the requisite outcome monotonicity conditions.
In Figure 4, we compute G(τ ) as τ varies from 0 to 100 for a
range of different value of α . For any α , the social utility gap is
increasing in τ . Moreover, as α becomes large, the rate of increase
in the social gap grows large as well.
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Figure 4: Impact of increasing the threshold τ on white and
black credit applicants. When the cost to changing one’s
score α is small, increases to the threshold have only a small
effect on the social gap. However, as α becomes large, even
small increases to the threshold can create large discrepan-
cies in social burden between the two groups.
5.2 Different Cost Functions
In Section 4.2, we demonstrated when two subpopulations are
identically distributed, but incur different costs for changing their
features, there is a non-trivial social gap between the two. In the
context of the FICO scores, it is plausible that blacks are both disad-
vantaged in features and experience higher costs for changing their
scores. For instance, outstanding debt is an important component
of FICO scores. One way to reduce debt is to increase earnings.
However, a persistent black-white wage gap between the two sub-
populations suggest increasing earnings is easier for group a than
group b [11]. This setting is not strictly captured by our existing
results, and we should expect the effects of both different costs
functions and different feature distributions to compound and ex-
acerbate the unfair impacts of strategic classification.
To illustrate this phenomenon, we again use a coarse linear cost
model. Suppose group A has cost cA(x ,x ′) = max{α(x ′ − x), 0} for
some α > 0, and group B has cost cB (x ,x ′) = max{β(x ′ − x), 0}
for some β ≥ α . As in Section 4.2, group B is disadvantaged in cost
provided the ratio κ = β/α > 1. In Figure 5, we show the social gap
G(τ ) for various settings of κ. The social gap is always increasing
as a function of τ , and the rate of increase grows large for even
moderate values of κ. When κ is large, even small increases in τ can
disproportionately increase the social burden for the disadvantaged
subpopulation.
6 RELATEDWORK
Strategic Classification. Prior work on strategic classification
focuses solely on the institution, primarily aiming to create high-
utility solutions for the institution. Our work, on the other hand,
studies the tradeoff between the institution’s utility and the burden
to the individuals being classified.
Brückner and Scheffer [5], Dong et al. [12], Hardt et al. [13]
give algorithms to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, which
corresponds to the extreme τ ∗ solution in our trade-off curves.
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Figure 5: Impact of increasing the threshold τ on white
and black credit applicants, under the assumption that both
groups incur different costs for increasing their credit score.
As the ratio between the costs κ increases, the social cost gap
grows rapidly between the two groups.
Although the Stackelberg equilibrium leads to maximal institutional
utility, we show that it also causes high social burden. We give
several examples of when the high social burden induced by the
Stackelberg equilibrium makes it an undesirable solution for the
institution.
Rather than the Stackelberg equilibrium, others have also consid-
ered finding Nash equilibria of the game [4, 10]. Brückner et al. [4]
argue that since in practice people cannot optimally respond to the
classifier, the Stackelberg solution tends to be too conservative, and
thus a Nash equilibrium strategy is preferable. Our work provides
a complementary reason to prefer Nash equilibria over the Stackel-
berg solution. Namely, for a broad class of cost functions, any Nash
equilibrium that is not equal to the Stackelberg equilibrium places
lower social burden on individuals.
Finally, we focus on the setting where individuals are merely
“gaming” their features, i.e., they do not improve their true label by
adapting their features. However, if the classifier is able to incen-
tivize strategic behavior that helps improve negative individuals,
then the social burden placed on positive individuals may be con-
sidered acceptable. Kleinberg and Raghavan [19] studies how to
design classifiers that produce such incentives.
Fairness. Our work studies how strategic classification results in
differing impacts to different subpopulations and is complemen-
tary to the large body of work studying the differing impacts of
classification [3, 22].
The prior work on classification is primarily concerned with
preventing unfairness that can arise due to subpopulations having
differing distributions over features or labels [8, 14? ]. We show
that in the strategic setting, a classifier can have differing impact
due to the subpopulations having differing distributions or differing
costs to adapting their features. Therefore, when individuals are
strategic, our work provides an additional reason to be concerned
about the fairness of a classifier. In particular, it can be easier for
one group to game the classifier than another.
Furthermore, we show that if the institution modifies the clas-
sifier it uses to be more robust to strategic behavior, then it also
as a side effect, increases the gap between the cost incurred by a
disadvantaged subpopulation and an advantaged population. Thus,
strategic classification can exacerbate unfairness in classification.
Our work is also complementary to Liu et al. [21], who also
analyze how the institution’s utility trades-off with the impact to
individuals. They study the trade-off in the non-strategic setting
and measure the impact of a classifier using a dynamics model of
how individuals are affected by the classification they receive. We
study the tradeoff in the strategic setting and measure the impact
of a classifier by the cost of the strategic behavior induced by the
classifier.
In concurrent work, ? ] also study negative externalities of strate-
gic classification. In their model, they show that the Stackelberg
equilibrium leads to only false negative errors on a disadvantaged
population and false positives on the advantaged population. Fur-
thermore, they show that providing a cost subsidy for disadvantaged
individuals can lead to worse outcomes for everyone.
7 DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL BURDEN
To measure the impact of strategic classification on the individuals
being classified, we introduced a measure of social burden, defined
as the expected cost that positive individuals need to incur to be
classified positively: B+(f ) = E
[
minf (x ′)=1 c(x ,x ′) | y = 1
]
. An
alternative measure one might consider is the expected individual
utility for the positives: S+(f ) = E [ux (f ,∆(x)) | y = 1], which we
will denote the social utility.
We prefer social burden to social utility because it makes fewer
assumptions about individual behavior. Social utility measures the
utility of the individual while assuming that they respond optimally
and needs the assumption to hold to be ameaningful measure. Social
burden, on the other hand, applies irrespective of the different
policies individuals may actually act according to. Our analysis
assumes the institution assumes individuals respond optimally, but
we ourselves believe this to be a strong assumption to hold in
practice, and would like our measure of impact on individuals to
apply regardless.
Moreover, most of our results are agnostic to the specific choice
of social cost measure. The results in Section 3 about the tradeoff
between institutional utility and social burden all still hold. Specifi-
cally, Theorem 3.1 holds with social utility instead of social burden
(and monotonically non-increasing instead of monotonically non-
decreasing since lower utility is worse). For our results in Section 4,
i.e, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, there is still always a non-negative social
gap (now defined as the difference in social utilities between the
groups), but it is not necessarily true that the social gap increases
as the institution’s threshold increases.
While both social burden and social utility apply only to positive
individuals, one could also use versions that integrate over all indi-
viduals:B(f ) = E
[
minf (x ′)=1 c(x ,x ′)
]
andS(f ) = E [ux (f ,∆(x))].
Our results forB+(f ) go through forB(f ), and the results forS+(f )
go through for S(f )1. However, in many cases giving a positive
1For the results in Section 4.1 the disadvantaged in features condition defined in
Definition 4.2 should be modified to no longer condition on Y = 1.
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classification (e.g. a loan) to a negative individual (someone who
will default) can result in a long-term negative impact to that in-
dividual [21]. In general, it is uncertain whether the reducing the
costs incured by the negative individuals confers positive social
benefits, and we do not incorporate these costs into our measure.
Overall, there are many potential measures that are complemen-
tary to our measure of social burden, but they all provide a similar
takeaway. Namely, that in the strategic setting, there is a tradeoff
between institutional accuracy and individual impact that must be
considered when making choices about strategy-robustness.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 3.2
Proof. The lemma follows by proving the following properties
about the Nash equilibrium strategies for the institution.
• The Stackelberg threshold τ ∗ is a Nash equilibrium strategy.
• All Nash equilibrium strategies lie in the interval [τ0,τ ∗].
• If τN is a Nash equilibrium strategy, then all τ ∈ [τN ,τ ∗] are
also Nash equilibrium strategies.
Together, the three properties imply that the set of institution equi-
librium strategies is [τN ,τ ∗] for some τN ∈ [τ0,τ ∗].
Before proceeding, we first establish and recall a few definitions.
Let ∆τ (x) be the best response of individual x to the threshold τ .
Define the set of individuals accepted for threshold τ and response
∆τ byA∆τ (τ ) = {x : fτ (∆τ (x)) = 1}. Recall the outcome likelihood
ℓ(x) = P(Y = 1 | X = x). Define the strategic outcome likelihood as
ℓ∆τ (x ′) = P(Y = 1 | ∆τ (X ) = x ′). The outcome likelihood is the
probability that an individual is positive given their true features,
while the strategic outcome likelihood is the probability that an
individual is positive given their gamed features.
For the pair (τ ,∆τ ) to be a Nash equilibrium, τ must be a best
response to the individual’s best response ∆τ (x). With knowledge
of the individual’s response, x ′ = ∆τ (x), the institution’s best
response is to play a threshold τ ′ so that x ′ ∈ A∆τ (τ ′) iff ℓ∆τ (x ′) ≥
0.5. Therefore, to show (τ ,∆τ ) is a Nash equilibrium, we must show
τ = τ ′, i.e. x ′ ∈ A∆τ (τ ) iff ℓ∆τ (x ′) ≥ 0.5.
To verify the condition x ′ ∈ A∆τ (τ ) iff ℓ∆τ (x ′) ≥ 0.5, there are
three cases to consider.
(1) If ℓ(x) > τ , then x ∈ A∆τ (τ ), ∆τ (x) = x , and ℓ∆τ (x) = ℓ(x).
Therefore, it suffices to check ℓ(x) ≥ 0.5.
(2) If ℓ(x) < τ and cL(ℓ(x),τ ) > 1, then x < A∆τ (τ ) and∆τ (x) =
x . In this case, it suffices to check ℓ(x) < 0.5.
(3) If ℓ(x) < τ and cL(ℓ(x),τ ) ≤ 1, then ∆τ (x) ∈ A∆τ (τ ), but
x , ∆τ (x), sowemust directly verify P(Y = 1 | cL(ℓ(X ),τ ) ≤
1, ℓ(X ) ≤ τ ) ≥ 0.5.
We now proceed to the proof.
First, we show the Stackelberg equilibrium (τ ∗,∆τ ∗ ) is a Nash
equilibrium. The Stackelberg threshold τ ∗ is the largest τ ∗ such
that cL(0.5,τ ∗) ≤ 1. If ℓ(x) > τ ∗, by monotonicity, ℓ(x) ≥ 0.5. If
ℓ(x) < τ ∗ and cL(ℓ(x),τ ∗) > 1, then ℓ(x) < 0.5 by definition of
τ ∗. Similarly, if ℓ(x) < τ ∗ and cL(ℓ(x),τ ∗) ≤ 1, then ℓ(x) ≥ 0.5,
so trivially P(Y = 1 | cL(ℓ(X ),τ ) ≤ 1, ℓ(X ) ≤ τ ) ≥ 0.5. Hence,
(τ ∗,∆τ ∗ ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Next, we show that all Nash strategies must lie in the interval
[τ0,τ ∗].
(1) Suppose τ < τ0 = 0.5. For all x such that ℓ(∆τ (x)) = τ ,
ℓ(x) < 0.5. Therefore, P(Y = 1 | cL(ℓ(X ),τ ) ≤ 1, ℓ(X ) ≤
τ ) < 0.5, so τ cannot be a Nash equilibrium strategy for the
institution.
(2) Suppose τ > τ ∗. By definition, τ ∗ is the largest τ such that
cL(0.5,τ ) ≤ 1. Thus, if τ > τ ∗, there exists x with ℓ(x) < τ ∗
and cL(ℓ(x),τ ) > 1, but ℓ(x) ≥ 0.5. Hence, τ cannot be a
Nash strategy.
Finally, we show that if τN is a Nash equilibrium strategy, then
so is τ for any τ ∈ [τN ,τ ∗]. We consider each of the three cases in
turn.
(1) Suppose ℓ(x) > τ . Then ℓ(x) > τ > τN ≥ τ0 = 0.5.
(2) Suppose ℓ(x) < τ and cL(ℓ(x),τ ) > 1. Since τ ≤ τ ∗, by mono-
tonicity in the second argument, cL(0.5,τ ) ≤ cL(0.5,τ ∗) ≤ 1.
By monotonicity in the first argument, since cL(0.5,τ ), if
cL(ℓ(x),τ ) > 1, then it must be the case that ℓ(x) < 0.5.
(3) Suppose ℓ(x) < τ and cL(ℓ(x),τ ) ≤ 1. Let L(τ ) = {l :
cL(l ,τ ) ≤ 1, l ≤ τ } be the set of outcome likelihoods that
game to the threshold τ and lτ = minl ∈Lτ l be the minimum
such outcome likelihood. The points that game under the
thresholds τN and τ form the intervals [lτN ,τN ] and [lτ ,τ ],
respectively. Since lτN ≤ lτ and τN ≤ τ , we have that
P(Y = 1 | cL(ℓ(X ),τ ) ≤ 1, ℓ(X ) ≤ τ )
= P(Y = 1 | ℓ(X ) ∈ [lτ ,τ ])
≥ P(Y = 1 | ℓ(X ) ∈ [lτN ,τN ])
= P(Y = 1 | cL(ℓ(X ),τN ) ≤ 1, ℓ(X ) ≤ τN ) ≥ 0.5
where the last inequality holds because tN is a Nash strategy.
Since each of the three cases are satisfied, any τ ∈ [τN ,τ ∗] is a
Nash strategy.
We have now demonstrated each of the three properties outlined
at the beginning, and the lemma follows. □
